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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
   
The right to strike is a keystone of modern industrial society. No society which lacks 
that right can be democratic. Any society which seeks to become democratic must 
secure that right.1 
 
Freedom of association and its cornerstone, the right to strike, are integral to 
effective labour relations and a free and democratic society. Industrial action serves 
as a vital counterpoint to managerial prerogative and ensures a fair balance between 
employer and employee interests in the workplace.   The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)  has promulgated a number of conventions and 
recommendations promoting the freedom of association, 2 including the Convention 
on Freedom and Protection of the Right to Organise3 (hereinafter referred to as 
Convention No. 87) and the Convention on the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining4 (hereinafter referred to as Convention No. 98). 5  Convention No. 87 
protects the rights of workers and employers without differentiation to establish and 
join organisations for occupational purposes and guarantees their free functioning. 
Convention No. 98 regulates workers’ protection against anti-union discrimination at 
the workplace and protects against employers’ interference in the affairs of 
employees’ organisations. These two conventions are amongst the most ratified 
                                                          
1
 L. MacFarlane, The Right to Strike (1981), p. 12. 
2Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (87 of 1948); Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining (98 of 1949); Workers Representatives (135 of 1971) (and accompanying 
Recommendation 143); Rural Workers and their role in Economic and Social Development (141 of 
1975) (and accompanying Recommendation 149); Labour Relations (Public Service) (151 of 1978) 
(and accompanying Recommendation 159); Promotion of Collective Bargaining (154 of 1981) (and 
Recommendation 163); Right of Association and the Settlement of Labour Disputes in Non-
Metropolitan Territories (84 of 1947); and Rights of Association and Combination of Agricultural 
Workers (11 of 1921).        
3No. 87 of 1948. 
4No.98 of 1949. 
5 H.M Seady and P.S. Benjamin ‘The Right to Strike and Freedom of Association: An International 
Perspective’ (1990) 11 ILJ 439. 
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conventions of the ILO.6 By ratifying these conventions, member states undertake to 
extend the rights and freedoms contained in and/or created by the Conventions to 
their respective nationals. 
 
In Southern Africa the countries of Botswana,7 Lesotho8 and South Africa,9 as 
members of the ILO, have ratified both Conventions No 87 and 98. In all three of 
these countries their respective Constitutions guarantee the freedom of association, 
subject to reasonable limitation.  Nonetheless in Lesotho it is unlawful for public 
officers to embark on strike action, considerably inhibiting such employees’ freedom 
of association. By contrast in Botswana and South Africa the right to strike is 
extended to public and private employees alike, without differentiation.  
 
Lesotho is dualist state, which implies that a treaty does not automatically become 
part of the domestic law of Lesotho upon ratification.10 Instead, international treaties 
have to be incorporated into the municipal law, for their provisions to be legally 
binding. For a country that embraces dualism, an act of transformation by an 
appropriate state organ is needed before the provisions of the treaty can operate 
within the national legal system. Transformation may take various forms, such as 
Parliamentary enactment incorporating directly the treaty norms into domestic law or 
a statute copying all or part of the treaty.11   
 
In Lesotho, transformation of Conventions No. 87 and 98 was first done by 
entrenching freedom of association in the Constitution12 and thereafter, by 
                                                          
6http://www.ilo.org/Search3/search.do?searchWhat=most+ratified+conventions&locale=en_US 
7 Ratified on 22 December 1997. The Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention No.151 of 1978 
was also ratified. 
8 Both Conventions were ratified by Lesotho on 30 October 1966. 
9 Both Conventions were ratified by South Africa on 18 February 1996. 
10
 J. Dugard International Law: South African Perspective (2011) at p.42; Dualists see international law and as 
completely different systems of law, with the result that international law may be applied by domestic courts 
only if adopted by the courts or transformed into domestic law by the legislature. According to the dualist 
school of thoughts, international law and municipal law differs so radically in the matter of subjects of the law, 
sources and substance. A rule of international law can never per se  be become part of the law of the land, it 
must be made so by an authority of the state. Thus some scholars (Lauterpacht) view dualism as a 
manifestation of the traditional legal positivism.  
11
 Botswana Public Employees Union and Others v Minister of Labour and Home Affairs and Another MAHLB-
000674-11 (unreported) at para 190. 
12
 Section 16 of the Constitution of Lesotho 1993 and 15 of the Constitution of Lesotho 1966. 
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enactment of two pieces of legislation. These are the Labour Code,13 which 
regulates the employment relationship in the private sector, and the Public Service 
Act,14 which regulates the employment relationship in the public sector. Whilst both 
these statutes provide for employees’ freedom of association, the Public Service Act, 
unlike the Labour Code, restricts public officers’ freedom of association. The Public 
Service Act provides that it is unlawful for public officers to embark on strike action.15 
In essence, therefore, the application of Conventions No. 87 and 98, in respect of 
public officers is limited and it is not clear whether such limitation is justified. 
 
This paper considers whether the limitations imposed on the freedom and right to 
strike of public officers in Lesotho are in breach of international obligations and are 
reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic society committed to the rule of 
law.  In so doing a comparative analysis of the jurisdictions of South Africa and 
Botswana is undertaken.  
1.2 Research Questions  
 
This dissertation attempts to find answers to the following questions: 
 
1. What is freedom of association and what are its advantages? 
a. How is the freedom or right to strike part of freedom of association? 
2. Is the right or freedom to strike an absolute right? 
a. What is the position taken by the ILO Conventions on the issue of 
strikes? 
b. What are the possible and justified limitations of freedom or right to 
strike? 
c. What are essential services? 
3. What is the law of Lesotho with regard to the freedom of association? 
a. To what extent does the law of Lesotho provide for the freedom or right 
to strike? 
                                                          
13
 Order No.24 of 1992; The Labour Code Order was passed by the military regime and it is now cited as the 
Labour Code Act No. 24 of 1992. 
14
 No. 1 of 2005. 
15
 Section 19(1). 
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b. Is any limitation of the Public Officers’ right or freedom to strike in 
Lesotho justified within a democratic society within which the rule of 
law prevails? 
4. What is the position of the law in the jurisdictions of Botswana and South 
Africa with regard to the public officers’ right or freedom to strike? 
5. What can Lesotho learn from the positions in these jurisdictions? 
 
1.3 Statement of Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate whether the limitation imposed on the public 
officers’ freedom of association in Lesotho is justified. Thus the focus will be on the 
jurisprudence of the Kingdom of Lesotho, with reference made, for comparative 
purposes, to some other jurisdictions. The study is divided into five chapters. 
Chapter one comprises of the introduction and literature review, Chapter two 
discusses the right to strike with the main focus being the jurisprudence of the ILO, 
Chapter three discusses the freedom of association in Lesotho with the main focus 
being the public officers freedom to strike while Chapter four is the comparative 
study discussing the public officers’ freedom of association in two jurisdictions, 
namely, South Africa and Botswana.16 The central point of discussion is the public 
officers’ right to strike in those jurisdictions and Chapter five is the conclusion and 
recommendations are made and discussed.  
 
Before going into the main body of this study, it is important to briefly explain the 
relationship between freedom of association and the freedom and/or right to strike. 
 
1.4 Deriving the Right or Freedom to Strike from Freedom of Association 
 
To best explain the relationship between freedom of association and right or freedom 
to strike, one should start by first defining the two terms or phrases. Freedom of 
association may be defined as the freedom of ‘individuals to join one another and to 
                                                          
16
These two jurisdictions are chosen because of the similarities with and the influence they have on the laws of 
Lesotho, especially in the case of South Africa.  
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take action for a legal purpose and by use of legal means’.17 It has been suggested 
that freedom of association requires freedom to strike because the latter is a species 
of the former.18 This argument is well founded and in conformity with the ILO 
jurisprudence. This is so because the right to strike is a channel through which 
workers exercise their freedom of association, to which they have a fundamental 
entitlement. The most popular version of this argument is that the right to strike 
‘furthers the functions of an institution, the trade union.’19 It is common cause that the 
right to form or join a trade union of ones’ choice is itself a species of the right to 
freedom of association.  The right to strike is, therefore, a means to the better 
functioning of the trade union.  
 
However, the right to strike is not inherent in the right to freedom of association.20 In 
essence, the right to strike is not an essential element of the freedom of association 
without which it would be impossible for workers to enjoy the freedom of association. 
This is the main reason why limitations and/or restrictions of the right to strike in 
certain industries may be justified (for instance, in essential services). It must, 
however, be emphasised that the right to strike is an efficient channel through which 
the fundamental entitlement to freedom of association can be enjoyed. Denying 
workers the right to strike unduly (without legal justification) can be equated to 
disarming soldiers at the battle field. 
 
1.5 Literature Review  
 
There are a number of textbooks by legal scholars which deal with the basic 
concepts of the freedom of association and the right to strike. Of these, the work of 
B. Gernogon, A. Odero and H. Guido,21 discussing the principles of the right to strike 
as formulated by the ILO, will be very important in laying the foundation of the 
                                                          
17
 S. Leader ‘Can you Derive a Right to Strike from Freedom of Association?’ (2009-2010) 15 Canadian Labour 
and Employment Journal 271 p272. 
18




 The European Court of Human Rights in Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden Eur HR Series A, No. 21 (1976) 
recognized that Article 11 European Convention contained a clear statement allowing trade union activity to 
exist. However, it stated that the right to strike was not inherent in the right to freedom of association so the 
State was free to limit the right to strike provided there was a justification for such limitation. 
21
 B. Gernigon et al ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike (2000). 
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arguments advanced in this study. These scholars discuss the concept of a strike, its 
objectives, who should enjoy this right, the notion of essential services and 
compensatory guarantees for those workers who do not enjoy the right to strike, as 
well as conditions for enjoying the right to strike. These arguments will be drawn on 
in the dissertation in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the limitation on the 
public officers’ right or freedom to strike in Lesotho is justified or not. In addition, 
there is some discussion in the literature around issues that these principles give rise 
to.  
 
These discussions mostly refer to the international labour jurisprudence and 
legislation in jurisdictions other than Lesotho. Thus Sheldon22 analyses the 
relationship of the right to strike and the freedom of association from the international 
perspective. He argues that the right to strike can be directly or indirectly derived 
from the freedom of association. The same argument is advanced with a focus on 
South African law, by Seady and Benjamin23  and by Mthombeni.24  Not only do 
these scholars not discuss the issue from the Lesotho perspective but they also do 
not discuss the limitations on the right to strike in a democratic society. This study 
will, therefore, take the issue further and discuss the limitation of the right to strike in 
a democratic society; in Lesotho.    
 
Nevertheless, there are scholars from other jurisdictions who have published studies 
concerning the limitation of the right to strike. Thus, Okene25 discusses the 
limitations on the freedom of the right to strike in Nigeria and he also discusses the 
balancing of the right to strike with the notion of essential services. He concludes 
that the right to strike may be regulated by law but should not be abolished or made 
impossible to exercise. Okene confines his arguments to the laws of Nigeria and not 
Lesotho. Although this study will pursue a similar argument, the argument in this 
study will be applied to the laws of Lesotho.  
                                                          
22
 L. Sheldon ‘Can you Derive a Right to Strike from the Right to Freedom of Association?’ (2009-2010) 15 
Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 271.   
23
 Seady, H.M and P.S. Benjamin, ‘The Right to Strike and Freedom of Association: An International Perspective’ 
(1990) 11 ILJ 439 
24
 R. Mthombeni, ‘The Right or Freedom to Strike: an Analysis from an International and Comparative 
Perspective’ (1990) 23 Comp. Int’l LJ S. Afr. 337. 
25
 O.V.C. Okene, ‘The Right of Workers to Strike in a Democratic Society: the Case of Nigeria’, (2007) 19 (No.1) 




Freedom of association and the right to strike for public sector employees in South 
Africa is discussed by Budeli.26  She analyses some cases dealing with the public 
sector employees’ right to strike in South Africa.27 She then compares the approach 
of the South African courts to the issue of public sector employees’ freedom of 
association with that of the Lesotho courts28 on the same issue. Her conclusion is 
that the South African approach, unlike that in Lesotho, is in line with international 
law. This study will advance the same argument but go even further to make 
suggestions as to how the laws of Lesotho may be aligned to international labour 
standards. This study will argue that if interpreted purposively, section 16 of the 
Constitution of Lesotho does not prohibit strikes in the public sector.  Arguments for 
and against the public sector strikes are the focus of the articles by Cordova29  and 
Ross.30 These arguments will be applied to Lesotho and critically considered in 
balancing the possible advantages and disadvantages of public sector strikes in that 
country.  
 
It is on the basis of this literature that this study will make an attempt to evaluate 
whether the limitation imposed on the public officers’ freedom or right to strike in 
Lesotho is justified. 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
The discussion above provides a foundation for the discussion that follows in the 
next chapters. From the discussion in this chapter, it is important to highlight the 
following points; Lesotho is a democratic state with a written constitution; it has 
ratified the important ILO conventions on freedom of association. However, such 
conventions cannot be directly applied in Lesotho as it is a dualist state. Lastly, 
although there is no express mentioning of the right to strike in the ILO 
jurisprudence, the right to strike is derived from the express right to freedom of 
association. The following chapter discusses the right to strike in depth.     
                                                          
26
M. Budeli, ‘Freedom of Association for Public Sector Employees’ (2003) 44 No.2 Cod 49.  
27
 SANDUv Minister of Defence and Another (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC); Independent Municipal and Allied Trade 
Union and Others v Rustenburg Transitional Council (2000) ILJ 377 (LC). 
28
 In LUPE v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 1997 (11) BLLR 1485. 
29
 E. Cordova, ‘Strikes in the Public Sector: Some Determining Factors’, (1985) 124 Int’l Lab. Rev. 163. 
30
 A.M. Ross, ‘Public Employee Unions and the Right to Strike’ (1969) 92 Monthly Lab. Rev. 14. 
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Chapter 2: Freedom or Right to Strike in Context 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In a democratic society, there are certain rights and/or freedoms that are enjoyed by 
workers. The workers’ right to withhold their labour as an attempt to compel the 
employer to accede to their demand is one of the fundamental rights and/or 
freedoms that workers in democratic societies enjoy. The act of withdrawal of labour 
by employees is commonly referred to as strike or industrial action. In this chapter, 
an attempt is made to define the concept of strike in the context of labour law. Two 
main types of strikes will be discussed.  
 
It is common cause that in any democratic society, there are some grounds upon 
which any of the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited. Therefore, this chapter will 
also discuss possible justifiable grounds upon which the right and/or freedom to 
strike may be limited. The most important ground of limitation that will be discussed 
extensively is the notion of essential services. 
 
2.2 The Right or Freedom to Strike 
 
Traditionally, the workers’ ability to embark on strike action was viewed as an 
important factor in the maintenance of ‘fair wages and reasonable working 
conditions, thereby improving the economic and social welfare’ of the greater part of 
the population.31 This was and continues on the premise that there is an imbalance 
in the bargaining power between labour and capital, such that in the absence of the 
right to strike, collective bargaining would amount to ‘collective begging’.32 This 
social justice argument has won recognition at international level and in most, if not 
all, countries.  
 
                                                          
31
 B. Nkabinde ‘The Right to Strike, an Essential Component of Workplace Democracy: Its Scope and Global 





The right or freedom to strike33 has generally been classified amongst the second 
generation rights that concern socio-economic rights.34 This category is basically 
divided into two: norms pertaining to goods meeting social needs (for example 
education, health care and shelter), and norms pertaining to the provision of goods 
meeting economic needs (for example work and fair wages, adequate living standard 
etc.).35  The right and/or freedom to strike belong to the latter group. 
 
However, it is axiomatic that there can be no meaning to freedom of association 
without the right or freedom to strike.36 The right to strike is an essential tool that 
trade unions use all over the world for the defence and promotion of the rights and 
interests of their members.37 Most importantly, the right to strike is a necessary 
counter-veiling force to the power of capital.38 There can be no equilibrium in 
industrial relations without a right to strike.39  
 
There are a number of definitions of the right to strike.40 In most jurisdictions, the 
right to strike is defined by a statutory instrument. Each definition reflects the position 
                                                          
33
 There is freedom to strike in countries where there is no express protection of the right to strike, however, 
strikes are not prohibited and strikers generally enjoy immunities from certain legal consequences.  While the 
right to strike obtains in jurisdictions where strike action is expressly protected and given precedence over the 
performance of contractual and other civil obligations. However, for purposes of consistency in this work, the 
phrase ‘right to strike’ will be used to refer to both right and freedom to strike.    
34
 Supra note 24 at 338; Human Rights are divided into three generations, civil-political rights, socio-economic 
rights and collective-developmental rights. This criteria was first proposed by a Czech jurist by the name of 
Karel Vasak in 1979 (available on http://www.s-j-c.net/main/english/images/humanrightsfinal.pdf).  
35
 http://www.globalization101.org/three-generations-of-rights (last accessed on the 25
th
 July 2013).  
36
 R. Mthombeni ‘The Right or Freedom to Strike: an International and Comparative Perspective’ (1990) 23 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 337 at 338. 
37
 O.V.C. Okene ‘The Right of Workers to Strike in a Democratic Society: the Case of Nigeria’ (2007) 19 (No.1) 




 P.Davies and M. Freedland Kahn-Freun’ds Labour and the Law (1983) p.292; Supra, note 10, p.194. 
40
 For example, Knowles, K.G.J.C., Strikes- A Study in Industrial Conflict (New York: 2952), p. 1 defines a strike 
as "a collective stoppage of work undertaken in order to bring pressure on the entrepreneur who depend on 
the sale or use of the products of that work. The strike must involve a group of employed workers that is there 
must be a definite employer-employee relationship between the parties involved in the dispute"; E.T. Hiller, 
The Strike: A Study in Collective Action (Chicago, ILL. : A University of Chicago Press 1982 ), p. 12 states that "a 
strike is the simultaneous and coordinated withdrawal of labour by workers" ; H. Collins, K.D. Ewing andA. 
McColgan, Labour Law: Text and Materials ( Oxford-Portland Oregon : Hart Publishing 2001 ), p.881, defines 
strike as "a withdrawal of labour by a group of workers who are in dispute with their employer, or perhaps 
with another party"; R.W. Rideout, Rideout's Principles of Labour Law p. 449 , defines a strike as "a deliberate 
and concerted withdrawal of labour"; Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 
1983), p.291, "a strike is a concerted stoppage of work."; Okene (supra) at p.194 defines strike as “a deliberate 
stoppage of work by workers in order to pressure on their employer to accede to their demands”. 
10 
 
in one jurisdiction or another. In Tramp Shipping Corporation v Greenwich Marine 
Incorp.41 Lord Denning MR defined strike as: 
 
A concerted stoppage of work by men, done with a view to improving their wages or 
conditions of employment, or giving vent to a grievance or making a protest about 
something or sympathising with other workmen in such endeavour It is distinct from 
stoppage brought by an external event such as a bomb scare or by apprehension of 
danger. 
 
There are three points from the above definition that are worth noting. Firstly, there 
should be stoppage of work. Secondly, the work stoppage must come as a result of 
concerted effort brought about by a group of people. Thirdly, the purpose of the work 
stoppage must be in connection with a dispute concerning terms of employment and 
physical conditions of work. The other important feature of the definition of Lord 
Denning MR is that a strike may either be primary or secondary in nature. The 
distinguishing feature between the two is that in the latter employees down their tools 
in support of fellow employees, while in the former participants’ demands affects 
them directly.  
 
2.3 Sources of the Right to Strike 
 
One of the United Nations’ (UN) treaties that enjoys high ratification rates, the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
recognises the right to strike. The ICESCR provides that the state parties thereto 
undertake to guarantee the enjoyment of the right to strike to their nationals provided 
such right is exercised in terms of the municipal laws of each state party.42 
Therefore, in terms of the covenant, member states are obliged to afford their 
nationals and those within their territorial boundaries the right to strike. However, the 
member states are allowed to enact laws prescribing how such right may be 
exercised; this may include limitation of the right.43 It is worth noting that the ICESCR 
                                                          
41
 [1975] 2 ALL E.R. 989 (C.A) at 990. 
42
 Article 8(1)(d). 
43
 Supra, note 25, p.197. 
11 
 
does not provide the purpose or the extent of such legal restrictions and or 
limitations on the right to strike. However, article 2(1) provides that: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.   
 
It follows therefore that in terms of the covenant, the limitations and/or restrictions 
that may be imposed on the exercise of the right to strike should not be permanent 
and more prohibitive in nature.   
 
The UN Commission on Human Rights which was charged with safeguarding the 
right or freedom to strike stated that recognition of the freedom of association alone 
is not sufficient for purposes of protecting the interests of the workers.44 The 
Commission submitted that the workers most effective means of protection is the 
guarantee of the right to strike. The Commission submitted further that although the 
right to freedom of association and the right or freedom to strike are two different 
things, there is, nonetheless, a close connection between them and to recognise the 
former without the latter would be tantamount to proclaiming a purely theoretical 
right.45         
 
The ILO is undoubtedly the pre-eminent authority and the most important source of 
all international labour law with a long established tradition and jurisprudence.46 It is 
therefore surprising to note that nowhere in its numerous conventions and 
recommendations does the ILO make express reference to the right to strike. 
However, it has been argued that the absence of an explicit provision does not mean 
that the ILO disregards the right to strike or refuses to deal with the appropriate 
measures for safeguarding its protection.47    
                                                          
44
 Supra, note 24, p.341. 
45
 Ibid p.341. 
46
 Supra, note 25, p.198. 
47
 Ibid, p.198; the right to strike was mentioned several times in the report of the International Labour 




There are at least two significant resolutions of the International Labour Conference 
which provides guidelines for the ILO policy,48 which emphasises recognition of the 
right to strike in ILO member states. The first resolution, the ‘Resolution concerning 
the Abolition of Anti-Trade Union Legislation in State Members of the International 
Labour Organisation’, urged the member states to enact ‘laws…to ensure the 
effective and unrestricted exercise of trade union rights, including the right to strike 
by workers’.49 The second resolution, the Resolution concerning Trade Union Rights 
and their Relation to Civil Liberties, which emphasised the need for action in a 
number of ways with ‘a view of considering further measures to ensure full and 
universal respect for trade union rights in their broadest sense paying particular 
attention, inter alia, on the right to strike’.50  
 
Decisions of the ILO’s supervisory bodies, especially those of the committee on the 
Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations constitutes further proof of the ILO’s support for 
the right to strike. The Committee on Freedom of Association ruled that strikes are 
part and parcel of trade union activities.51 The Committee regards the right to strike 
as ‘one of the essential means available to workers' and their organisations for the 
promotion and protection of their economic and social interests’.52 The Committee of 
Experts also aligned itself with the same opinion and even added that the right to 
strike by workers is not only exercised to achieve better working conditions but also 
used as a tool to facilitate ‘solutions to economic and social policy questions and to 
labour problems of any kind which are of direct concern to workers’.53  
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These supervisory bodies have always made reference to the right to strike when 
considering applications made in terms of Articles 354 and 855 of Convention No. 87, 
lodged by several member states. The ILO, through these supervisory bodies, has 
always reaffirmed the principle of the right to strike subject to restrictions that are 
deemed reasonable in a free and democratic society.56 These restrictions should be 
contained in a statutory instrument or an Act of Parliament depending of the laws of 
each member state. 
 
2.4 The Purpose of Strike 
 
Mere stoppage of work does not amount to a strike in labour law.57 To qualify as a 
strike, the stoppage of work must be based on a particular reason or demand. Thus, 
the South African Labour Court in Floraline v SASTAWU58 held that there was no 
strike since the stoppage of work was not for a particular reason or demand. The 
same finding was reached by the Court in FAWU v Rainbow Chicken Farms.59 The 
ILO recognises that workers may embark on a strike for three different reasons, 
namely: employment interest, secondary strikes and protest action. 
 
A strike action is in pursuit of employment interest if it relates to a dispute of an 
occupational nature. The ILO finds this reason legitimate, according to the 
Committee of Experts60 and the Committee on Freedom of Association61 the right to 
strike could be used by workers to protect employment interests between employers 
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and employees.62 In this kind of a strike, employees (strikers) often have a direct and 
substantial interest in the outcome of the strike (or dispute). For this reason, such 
strikes are referred to as primary strikes.  
 
In Education International and others v Canada,63 the employees were denied the 
right to strike during collective bargaining with their employer. The Committee on 
Freedom of Association held that the right to strike is one of the legitimate and 
essential means through which workers and their unions (or organisations) may 
defend their economic and social interests at work.64 In a similar case65 where public 
officers that went on a strike were dismissed, imprisoned and some injured by the 
police officers, the Committee on Freedom of Association expressed a similar point. 
It held that the right to strike constitutes one of the essential means that workers and 
workers’ organisations must have at their disposal in order to promote and defend 
their occupational interests.66  
 
However, strikes are not restricted only to issues that are likely to be resolved by 
collective agreements.67 In essence, the workers’ right to strike is not restricted only 
to issues relating to better working conditions or collective claims of an occupational 
nature; they may also strike over economic and social policy issues that are of direct 
concern to them.68 This kind of strike is normally referred to as protest action.69  This 
includes strikes aimed at challenging the government’s socio-economic policy. It 
does not, however, follow that where the right to strike is guaranteed protest action is 
also guaranteed. Most countries recognise the right to strike over occupational 
interest.70   
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Thus, in a case71 where the Peruvian government had prohibited protest actions, the 
Committee on Freedom of Association held that strikes are one of the essential 
means available to workers and their organisations for the promotion and protection 
of their occupational and economic interests in the broad sense of the term. It held 
further that these interests do not only have to do with obtaining better working 
conditions but also with seeking solutions to economic and social policy questions, to 
labour problems of any kind which are of direct concern to workers.72  
 
According to the ILO standards, employees have a right to embark on a protest 
action against a wide range of socio-economic issues adopted by the government.73 
Thus, the Committee on Freedom of Association declared a 24-hour general strike, 
forcing the government in Ecuador to change its economic policy by reducing prices 
and unemployment, permissible.74 In compliance with the same principle, the 
Committee held that a protest action demanding an end to killing of trade union 
members was permissible and in compliance with the principles of freedom of 
association.75  However, it is worth noting that ILO standards do not extend 
protection to purely political strikes. The ILO supervisory bodies have held that 
strikes that are purely political in nature do not fall within the ambit of the principle of 
freedom of association.76 
 
Moreover, employees may embark on a strike merely for purposes of assisting other 
employees on a strike against another employer. This kind of a strike is known as a 
secondary strike.77 It is secondary because employees working for an employer who 
is not a party to the primary strike engage in a strike against this employer in order to 
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show their support for the primary strike.78 In such cases employees does not have a 
direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the dispute.79  
 
The ILO standards protect secondary strikes. This was demonstrated by the decision 
of the Committee on Freedom of Association in a case where the Turkish 
government had declared a ban on secondary strikes; the committee held that that 
was a violation of freedom of association and the right to organise.80 The Committee 
held further that the general banning of secondary strikes is abusive and that 
workers should be able to carry out such actions.81  
 
2.5 Conditions for Exercising the Right to Strike   
 
Employees cannot just withhold their labour. Like any other right, there are 
conditions or requirements that compliance with is a prerequisite of lawfully 
exercising the right to strike. The Committee on Freedom of Association has 
specified that although each member state is entitled to enact laws laying down 
conditions to be met in order to render a strike lawful, such conditions should be 
‘reasonable and in any event not such as to place substantial limitation’82 on the 
right.  
 
The Committee on Freedom of Association has accepted and recognised the 
following conditions as reasonable: 
 
• ‘the obligation to give prior notice’;83  
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• ‘the obligation to have recourse to conciliation, mediation and (voluntary) 
arbitration procedures in industrial disputes as a prior condition to declaring a 
strike, provided that the proceedings are adequate, impartial and speedy and 
that the parties concerned can take part at every stage’;84 
 
• ‘the obligation to observe a certain quorum and to obtain the agreement of a 
specified majority’;85 
 
• ‘the obligation to take strike decisions by secret ballot’;86 
 
• ‘the adoption of measures to comply with safety requirements and for the 
prevention of accidents’;87 
 
• ‘the establishment of a minimum service in particular cases’;88 and 
 
• ‘the guarantee of the freedom to work for non-strikers’.89 
 
These factors are briefly discussed below.  
2.5.1 Conciliation, Mediation and Voluntary Arbitration 
 
As indicated above, the Committee on Freedom of Association accepts that 
industrial disputes may first be subjected to conciliation, arbitration and (voluntary) 
arbitration90 before one of the parties may call a strike, provided that such 
procedures are ‘adequate’ and not merely a formality or a delay tactic on the part of 
the other party.91 The Committee of Experts stated that: 
 
                                                          
84
 Ibid., paras. 500 and 501. 
85
 ibid., paras. 506-513. 
86
 ibid., paras. 503 and 510. 
87
 ibid., paras. 554 and 555.  
88
 ibid., paras. 556-558. 
89
 ibid., para. 586. 
90
 Note, however, that in some cases arbitration may be compulsory, for instance, in a case of dispute of 
interest involving workers in essential services in the strict meaning of the term. 
91
 Supra, note 83, p.26. 
18 
 
In a large number of countries legislation stipulates that the conciliation and 
mediation procedures must be exhausted before a strike may be called. The spirit of 
these provisions is compatible with Article 4 of Convention No. 98, which encourages 
the full development and utilization of machinery for the voluntary negotiation of 
collective agreements. Such machinery must, how-ever, have the sole purpose of 
facilitating bargaining: it should not be so complex or slow that a lawful strike 
becomes impossible in practice or loses its effectiveness.92 
 
In terms of Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation,93 during 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration, none of the parties should resort to calling a 
strike and/or lockout as the case may be and both parties to the dispute are 
expected to accept the arbitration award.94 However, it is worth noting that except in 
those cases where compulsory arbitration is acceptable, ‘it would be contrary to the 
workers’ organisations right to organise their activities and formulate their programs 
as laid down in Article 3 of Convention No. 87’95 to subject all labour disputes to 
compulsory arbitration.96  
 
2.5.2 Quorum and Majority for Declaring Strikes 
 
With regard to the quorum and majority (of the workers’ organisation) for declaring a 
strike, the Committee on Freedom of Association has stated that the standard should 
not be too high (e.g. two third majority), especially where the organisation has a 
huge membership. The Committee stated that: 
  
The requirement of a decision by over half of all the workers involved in order to 
declare a strike is excessive and could excessively hinder the possibility of carrying 
out a strike, particularly in large enterprises. The requirement that an absolute 
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majority of workers should be obtained for the calling of a strike may be difficult, 
especially in the case of unions which group together a large number of members. A 
provision requiring an absolute majority may, therefore, involve the risk of seriously 
limiting the right to strike.97   
 
The Committee of Experts then confirmed that: 
  
In many countries legislation subordinates the exercise of the right to strike to prior 
approval by a certain percentage of workers. Although this requirement does not, in 
principle, raise problems of compatibility with the Convention, the ballot method, the 
quorum and the majority required should not be such that the exercise of the right to 
strike becomes very difficult, or even impossible in practice.98 
 
In essence therefore, the member state may enact pieces of legislation to the effect 
that only a certain number or percentage of workers involved in the dispute may call 
a strike. However, such thresholds should not be unreasonable, or have an effect of 
undermining the workers’ right to strike. 
2.5.3 Freedom to Work for Non-Strikers 
 
As much as the Committee on Freedom of Association recognises the workers’ right 
to strike, the Committee also recognises that those employees who do not wish to 
engage in strike action still maintain their freedom to work despite the strike.99 The 
workers on strike should not in any way hinder the enjoyment of this freedom. The 
Committee of Experts also endorsed this principle when, ‘in connection with strike 
picketing, it emphasised that such action should be peaceful and should not lead to 
acts of violence against persons’.100 It is worth noting however, that in some cases, 
the Committee recognises that there may be a need for imposing the requirement of 
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‘minimum safety services’ in cases of a strike so as to protect people, prevent 
accidents and safeguard machinery and equipment.101   
 
Where ‘minimum operational services’ are concerned, that is, workers intended to 
maintain certain level of production or services of their employer whom the strike 
action is against, the Committee on Freedom of Association has stated that: 
 
The establishment of minimum services in the case of strike should only be possible 
in: (1) services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or 
health of the whole or part of the population (essential services in the strict sense of 
the term); (2) services which are not essential in the strict sense of the term but 
where the extent and duration of a strike might be such as to result in an acute 
national crisis endangering the normal living conditions of the population; and (3) 
public services of fundamental importance.102  
 
Moreover, the Committee has emphasised the need to engage both the employer 
and employees’ or their associations and/or organisations together with some public 
authorities in determining the criteria to be followed in selecting workers to maintain 
the minimum operations.103 
 
2.6 Exceptions to the Right or Freedom to Strike 
 
Like any other right, the right or freedom to strike is not an absolute right. Therefore, 
the ILO recognises some exceptions may operate against the right to strike. Outside 
these exceptions, the prohibition and/or restriction imposed on the right to strike will 
be contrary to international labour standards.104 General prohibition against the 
enjoyment of the right to strike may generally be justifiable in the event of ‘an acute 
national emergency’.105 However, even in such situations, it should only be for a 
limited period of time. It is important to note that in times of ‘national emergency’, the 
responsibility of suspending the strike on grounds of national security or public health 
                                                          
101
 Supra note 99, paras 554-555; Supra, note 82, p30. 
102
 Supra, note 99, para 556. 
103
 Supra, note 83, p30. 
104
 Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
Governing Body of the ILO, 5
th
 (Revised Ed) 2006, para 525. 
105
 Ibid, para 570. 
21 
 
should not lie with the government, but with an independent body which enjoys 
confidence of all parties concerned.106   
 
Apart from the general exemption discussed above, there are three groups of 
workers that ILO recognises that their right to strike may legitimately be limited or 
restricted and even prohibited. These are members of the police and armed forces, 
certain public officers ‘exercising authority’107  in the name of the state (this limitation 
is discussed further in chapter 3) and workers in essential services properly so 
called.108 Members of the police and armed forces are excluded from the operation 
of Convention No. 87 from which the right to strike is derived. This, however, does 
not deprive the member states of the discretion to extend the rights under the 
convention to these categories of workers. 
2.7 The Notion of Essential Services 
 
The phrase ‘essential services’ has been defined as those services ‘whose 
interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of 
the population’.109 What is essential depends on the particular circumstances of each 
country.110 However, in designating services as essential, ILO urges member states 
to follow the objective criteria of the ‘existence of a clear and imminent threat to the 
life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’.111 Furthermore, 
this concept is not absolute, in the sense that non-essential services may become 
essential if the strike lasts beyond a certain period of time ‘thus endangering the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population’.112 
 
The Committee on Freedom of Association noted specifically that the principle 
regarding the prohibition of strikes in essential services might lose its meaning if the 
strike action were to be declared illegal in one or more undertakings which are not 
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performing essential services in the strict meaning of the term. The Committee 
stated that it would not be appropriate if all state owned undertakings were to be 
treated as essential without distinguishing between those which are genuinely 
essential and those that are not.113 The Committee then accepted the following as 
essential services: the hospital sector, electricity services, water supply, 
telecommunications services, police and armed forces, fire fighting services, prison 
services, provision of food to pupil in schools and cleaning of schools and air traffic 
control services.114   
 
It is worth noting that while the Committee has found that the education sector does 
not constitute an essential service, it has held that principals and vice-principals can 
have their right to strike restricted or even prohibited.115 The Committee has not 
been persuaded by a number of arguments advanced before it in support of the 
prohibition of strikes in the teaching sector. In a number of cases referred to it, the 
Committee has constantly held that even the possible long-term consequences of 
strikes in the teaching sector does not justify a prohibition of strikes in that sector.116  
 
However, where the right to strike has been limited, restricted or prohibited in the 
essential services, adequate protection should be given to workers to compensate 
for the limitation.117  In essence, workers in essential services should not be left 
without a proper channel of addressing disputes of interest with their employer. 
There should be adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings to which parties to the dispute can resort to at any stage of the dispute, 
and the award, once issued should be fully and promptly implemented.118  
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This chapter defined and discussed the concept of strike, the sources of the right or 
freedom to strike, the purpose which is served by strikes in modern day labour law 
and the conditions that must be complied with before labour may be withdrawn from 
the workplace. Most importantly, this chapter highlighted that the right to strike is not 
an absolute right, there are some limitations recognised at international level and 
each state is at liberty to pass legislations limiting and/or prohibiting the exercise of 
the right to strike, provided that such legislation complies with international labour 
standards. Further, in this chapter, the notion of ‘essential services’ was defined and 
discussed. The next chapter considers the freedom to strike with specific reference 





























In previous chapters, the discussions flowed from an international perspective. In this 
chapter, the discussion will concentrate on the jurisprudence of Lesotho; the laws 
relating to freedom of association and the freedom to strike. The discussions in this 
chapter will dwell specifically on the independent Kingdom of Lesotho, that is, post-
independence. 
 
3.2 Historical Development of Freedom of Association in Lesotho 
 
The modern day Kingdom of Lesotho; the former Basutoland, attained its 
independence on the 4th day of October 1966.119 Thereafter, Lesotho ceased to exist 
as a colony; it became a sovereign state. As a sovereign state, it adopted its first 
Constitution, the Lesotho Independence Order.120 The Independence Order provided 
for freedom of association for a number of purposes, including, for labour 
purposes121. 
 
Upon attaining sovereignty, the first parliament of Lesotho acceded to all 
international obligations of Basutoland. Thus, Lesotho acceded to the obligations of 
Basutoland under the ILO Constitution and ratified the two important conventions; 
the Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise122 
and the Convention on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining.123 
 
Not only did Lesotho accede to the international obligations of Basutoland, it also 
acceded to all other laws that operated within Basutoland. These included, inter alia, 
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the Trade Unions and Trade Dispute Law124 which had been repealed by the Trade 
Unions and Trade Disputes Proclamation.125 Section 2 (2) of the former Act provided 
that: 
  
This law shall apply to all government and local authorities and all persons in service 
of the Crown in Basutoland, in the same manner as if they were private employers or 
employees as the case may be. 
 
The other important piece of legislation that was acceded to by Lesotho was the 
Public Service Proclamation126. This proclamation regulated the then public officers 
of Lesotho and it allowed them participation in trade unions and trade unions’ 
activities.127 This proclamation was repealed by the Public Service Act.128 
 
The Public Service Act prima facie complied with Lesotho’s obligations under the ILO 
Constitution and conventions ratified; it upheld the importance of the freedom of 
association without distinction whatsoever.129 However, the Essential Services 
Act,130 enacted in 1975, listed virtually all public officers as ‘essential services 
providers’,131 and as such, prohibited them from engaging in industrial action or 
strike. This limitation attracted the ILO’s attention,132 resulting in the call for an 
update of the labour laws of the country to facilitate compliance with international 
labour standards. 
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Thus, through the assistance of the ILO, the Labour Code133 was enacted, which, in 
effect repealed all other labour laws which were in place prior to its enactment. 
Section 6 of the Code provides that all employees and employers have equally 
guaranteed freedom of association. In support of this, section 168 confers upon all 
employers and employees, the right to join and/or establish organisations of their 
own choice without prior authorization of the government.134 
 
Despite the enactment of the Labour Code, a different piece of legislation was 
subsequently enacted to regulate the public officers; the Public Service Act.135 This 
Act expressly excluded public officers from the scope of application of the Labour 
Code; with section 35 of the Act expressly providing that ‘the Labour Code Order 
1992 shall not apply to public officers’. Over and above this provision, section 31 of 
the Act provided that: 
 
 
31. (1) Public officers may form and establish a staff association or staff 
associations under the provisions of the Societies Act 1966. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other law, public officers shall not become members 
of any trade union registered under the Labour Code Order 1992. 
 
Following the enactment of the Public Service Act 1995, all public officers’ trade 
unions registered in terms of the Labour Code then ceased to exist.136 Thus the 
Lesotho Union of Public Employees (LUPE) challenged the constitutionality of the 
two section of the Act referred to above. In LUPE v the Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Others,137 LUPE contended that sections 31 (2) and 35 of the Public 
Service Act 1995 were unconstitutional because they were inconsistent with section 
16 of the Constitution. 
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In that case, the applicants (LUPE) argued that the two sections being challenged 
infringed the state’s obligations under international law.138 They argued that the 
limitation imposed by sections 31 (2) and 35 on the public officers’ freedom of 
association was not justified and as such violated their rights as protected by section 
16 (1) of the Constitution.139 They argued further that this limitation could not be 
justified under section 16 (2) (c)140 of the Constitution as the limitation was not 
necessary and could not be justifiable in a democratic society, therefore, they argued 
that section 16 (3) of the Constitution was not satisfied.141 
 
The respondents (government of Lesotho) argued that trade unions are inherently 
confrontational in nature. Therefore, allowing trade unions in the public sector would 
amount to bringing the government services to a standstill, because there will be no 
money to meet the union’s high demands for higher wages (see annexure 1 for the 
wage distribution per sector). It was further argued that trade unions are best placed 
in the private sector since, unlike the public sector, the private sector is profit 
oriented.  
 
The Court held that the government is, in terms of section 16 (2) of the Constitution, 
entitled to impose restrictions on public officers, however, such restrictions should be 
justifiable under section 16 (3). The Court then found that the sections challenged by 
the applicants pursued a legitimate aim, the preservation of a sound economy which 
is a pressing social need. The Court concluded that the sections challenged were 
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justifiable under section 16 (3) and did not abridge the rights protected by section 16 
(1) to a greater extent than is necessary in a democratic society. Thus the 
application was dismissed. 
 
The Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions (COLETU) then took up the matter with the 
ILO. Before the Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association, COLETU 
alleged that by promulgating the Public Service Act 1995 the government of Lesotho 
failed to comply with the conventions ratified by Lesotho, especially Convention No. 
87 of 1948 and Convention No. 98 of 1949.142 In response to this, the ILO 
summoned the government to submit comments in relation to COLETU’s complaint 
and to make appropriate changes to the legislation.143 
 
The Public Service Act of 2005144 was thereafter enacted, which is, to date, used 
and applied in the regulation of public officers while the Labour Code regulates 
employees in the private sector. However, the provisions of this Act do not depart 
much from those of the 1995 Act. Public officers cannot form and/or join trade 
unions145 and it is illegal for public officers to embark on a strike action.146 Therefore, 
for public officers in Lesotho, the ILO promises of indiscriminate protection of 
worker’s right to freedom of association and the right to organise, remains an 
aspiration. 
 
3.3 Freedom of Association in the Public Sector 
 
It is a trite principle of law that, where a state has a written constitution, the 
constitution is the supreme law of the land.147 It is in line with this principle of 
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constitutional supremacy that the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho148 (the 
Constitution) provides that ‘the Constitution is the supreme law and if any other law 
is inconsistent with it that law shall to the extent of its inconsistency be void’.149 
 
Chapter two of the Constitution provides for the protection of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. Section 16 in this chapter of the Constitution provides in no 
uncertain terms that everyone is entitled to freedom to associate freely with others 
for a number of purposes, inter alia labour purposes. It is worth noting at this stage 
that rights and freedoms entrenched in chapter two of the Constitution are justiciable; 
unlike those in chapter three entitled ‘Principles of State Policy’. These include inter 
alia, ‘Just and Favorable Conditions of Work’150 and ‘Protection of Workers’ Rights 
and Interests’.151  
 
As noted, however, these principles of state policy are not justiciable, as they are 
subject to section 25152 of the Constitution. However, upon enactment of an Act of 
Parliament recognizing these principles as fundamental rights, they may be 
justiciable in the same manner as the fundamental human rights and freedoms 
contained in chapter two of the Constitution.153 
 
As discussed above, there is no single piece of legislation regulating both public and 
private sector employees in Lesotho. For the private sector employees, there is the 
Labour Code with its amendments and for public sector employees, the Public 
Service Act with its amendments. Both these pieces of legislation recognize the 
workers’ freedom of association. However, as noted above, unlike the situation with 
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private sector employees, it is illegal for civil servants in Lesotho to form and/or join 
trade unions154 and to embark on industrial action.155 
 
It is worth noting that freedom of association in Lesotho is not an absolute right; 
there are some constitutionally recognised limitations to section 16 (1) of the 
Constitution. These are; interest of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality, public health and protection of rights and freedoms of others. Lastly, but 
most importantly for public sector employees, freedom of association may also be 
limited for purposes of imposing restrictions upon public officers.156  
 
It is on this ground that the High Court in LUPE v The Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Others dismissed LUPE’s application. While in that case, the court 
was interpreting a limitation under the Public Service Act of 1995 it is not different in 
substance from the limitation currently imposed by the Public Service Act of 2005. 
Kheola CJ (as he then was) held that: 
 
It seems to me that although the Government has completely banned trade unions as 
far as public officers are concerned, the freedom of association has not been 
banned. Section 31 (1) of the Public Service Act, 1995 provides that 'Public officers 
may form and establish a staff association or staff associations under the provisions 
of the Societies Act 1966.'…157  
 
His Lordship went on and held that: 
  
I have come to the conclusion that the impugned legislation pursues the legitimate 
aim listed in section 16 (2) (c) of The Constitution. It seems to me that there is a 
proper balance between the applicant's interests of establishing staff association or 
staff associations in order to enjoy the fundamental human right of freedom of 
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association and the general public interest of preserving a sound economy of the 
country.158 
 
In essence, the provision (of the Public Service Act of 1995) limiting the public 
officers’ freedom of association just like sections 19 and 30 of the Public Service Act 
of 2005, was rendered justifiable under section 16 (2) (c) of the Constitution.159 The 
judgment of Kheola CJ in LUPE, thus, begs the question; how can the public officers 
efficiently address issues and/or disputes of interest in the workplace?    
 
3.4 Right or Freedom to Strike: Public Officers 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the ILO standards set out in Convention 87 
require that all workers ‘without distinction whatsoever’ be entitled to establish and 
join organisations of their choosing without prior authorisation. However, the 
members of the military and the police force are excluded from the operation of this 
provision.160 In most industrialised countries, this right has been extended to the 
public officials.161  
 
On the other hand, due to the fact that strike action is one of the fundamental means 
for rendering effective the rights and freedoms of workers’ organisations and/or 
unions to ‘organise their...activities’162 the freedom to strike has been recognised by 
the ILO. 163  There is, however, no express mention of the right to strike in the ILO 
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Conventions.164 This does not suggest that the ILO disregards this right. There are at 
least two resolutions of the International Labour Conference (which provide 
guidelines for ILO policy) that emphasise the importance of the freedom to strike. 
 
The first is the resolution concerning the Abolition of Anti-Trade Union Legislation in 
the State Members of the ILO that called for the adoption of ‘laws...to ensure the 
effective and unrestricted exercise of trade union rights, including freedom and/or 
right to strike by workers’.165 The second is the Resolution Concerning Trade Union 
Rights and their Relation to Civil Liberties that called for action in a number of ways 
‘with a view to considering further measures to ensure full universal respect for trade 
union rights in the broadest sense’, with particular attention, inter alia, on the 
freedom to strike.166      
 
Despite the fact that the ILO recognises the freedom to strike, it also recognises 
three limitations, viz: in the military and police service, public service and essential 
services in the strict meaning of the word.167 However, public officers’ are not left 
without protection at international level. The Committee on Freedom of Association 
and the Committee of Experts both agree that where public officers’ freedom to strike 
has been limited and/or prohibited, they should enjoy sufficient guarantees to protect 
their interests at the workplace.168 This may include but not limited to appropriate, 
impartial and prompt conciliation and arbitration of interest disputes, provided that 
the arbitration award will be binding on both parties and are fully and promptly 
applied.169  
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The ILO  has observed that too broad a definition of the concept of public servant or 
in the case of Lesotho, public officer, is likely to result in a very wide restriction or 
even prohibition of the freedom to strike in the public sector.170 For this reason, the 
Committee of experts has endeavoured to establish fairly uniform criterion in order to 
examine compatibility of legislation with the provisions of Convention No. 87. The 
Committee has therefore found it justifiable that public officers exercising authority in 
the name of the state may have their freedom to strike limited and/or prohibited.171   
 
The Committee was aware that except for those groups of public officers whose 
duties are clearly defined, in most cases the issue will frequently be the degree to 
which one’s duty or duties reflect on the state. For this reason, the Committee has 
suggested that, in borderline cases, a solution might be ‘not to impose a total 
prohibition of strikes, but rather to provide for a negotiated minimum service by a 
defined and limited category of staff, when a total and prolonged stoppage might 
result in serious consequences for the public’.172    
    
As discussed above, despite the international support for the freedom to strike in the 
public sector173, in Lesotho (a member of ILO) the freedom to strike is totally 
prohibited in the public sector. As discussed above, freedom of association is 
provided for by section 16 of the Constitution. Section 16 (1) provides as follows: 
 
Every person shall be entitled to, and (except with his own consent) shall not be 
hindered in his enjoyment of freedom to associate freely with other persons for 
ideological, religious, political, economic, labour, social, cultural, recreational and 
similar purposes. 
 
Nevertheless, section 16(2) (c) limits this right by providing that: 
  
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of any law to the extent that the law in question 
makes provision – 
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(c) for the purpose of imposing restrictions upon public officers. 
 
It is on the basis of this provision that section 19 of the Public Service Act provides 
that it is unlawful for public officers to embark on a strike. However, there is no 
mechanism put in place by the Public Service Act and its Amendments for resolution 
of disputes of interest that may arise in the public sector. Section 17 of the Public 
Service Act establishes a Conciliation Board, providing that its main duty is to 
conciliate over disputes of interest.174 However, despite the fact that from 
conciliation, public officers cannot call a strike, the award of the Conciliation Board is 
merely advisory in nature, thus not binding on parties.175    
 
The question, therefore, is whether this limitation on the public officers’ freedom to 
strike is justifiable in a democratic society in which the rule of law is embraced. To 
answer this question, the principle of proportionality must be applied.176 This 
principle provides that a limitation of the Bill of Rights will be justifiable ‘only when it 
is necessary in the light of the interests advanced as weighed against the 
requirements of a democratic society’.177 It requires striking a balance between 
competing interests by weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the 
measure.178 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court in Regina v Oakes179 held that, in determining 
whether a limitation clause (limiting the Bill of Rights) is justified or not, there is a 
need to engage in a two-stage process. The first stage requires the applicant to 
show how the legislation in question infringes upon the rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, both as a matter of interpretation and as a matter of 
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fact.180 The second stage requires the court to determine whether the law adopted is 
reasonable and demonstrably justifiable.181  
 
The two-stage process allows the state to justify the law by reference to its purpose 
and to the three-tier proportionality test:182 
 
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in 
question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In 
short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if 
rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair as little as 
possible" the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality 
between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter 
right or freedom [Bill of Rights], and the objective which has been identified as of 
sufficient importance.183 
 
The above limitation test echoes the limitation clause in section 16 (3) of the 
Constitution.184 Thus the same standard has been applied by the High Court of 
Lesotho in Ts’epe v IEC and Others185 in limiting the right enshrined in section 20 (1) 
of the Constitution.186 
 
The term democratic society denotes that government’s action or law must be 
proportional to interests protected and a balance should be struck between societal 
interests and the state.187 For section 19 of the Public Service Act to be justifiable, 
there should be a pressing need to protect the government against the exercise of 
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organisational rights in accordance with the international labour standards that the 
state subscribes to.  
 
In LUPE188  the government of Lesotho justified the prohibition of the freedom to 
strike in the public sector by arguing that ‘the object of parliament is to fight strikers 
in the public service or to cultivate harmonious relationship between the public 
officers and the government of Lesotho’.189 Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle, the then prime 
minister of Lesotho, in his answering affidavit in LUPE deposed that the public 
officers are denied the freedom to strike so as ‘to prevent a situation whereby 
untenable claims for remuneration may be made by public officers when the 
government has no means to meet them’.190  
 
This argument undermines the importance of the freedom to strike and should not be 
upheld. The Committee on Freedom of Association observed that ‘strikes are part 
and parcel of the union activities; it is one of the essential means available to 
workers...for the promotion and protection of their economic and social interests’.191 
The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
observed that ‘these interests not only have to do with obtaining better working 
conditions and pursuing collective demands of an occupational nature, but also 
seeking solutions to economic and social policy questions and to labour problems of 




In Lesotho, at the present time, there is no enjoyment of the freedom to strike by the 
public officers. In this regard, Lesotho lags far behind most developing and 
developed countries. This clearly infringes its obligations under international law by 
failing to comply with the international labour standards. The continued suppression 
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of public officers’ freedom to strike must be seriously addressed. As discussed 
above, Lesotho has ratified the entire core of the ILO Conventions, particularly No.87 
and No.98. It is a signatory to the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. As such, it is bound by article 2(1) to provide the positive right 
enshrined in article 8(1)(d) through legislative or other measure. The freedom to 
strike may be regulated by law but not curbed.193  The need to reform the Lesotho 
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Chapter Four: Comparative Study  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on the public officers’ right and/or freedom to strike194 in two 
jurisdictions, viz: the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Botswana. The 
two countries are chosen because of the influence they have on the laws of Lesotho 
and the similarities that their laws have with the laws of Lesotho.195 
 
4.2 The Right to Strike: the Republic of South Africa  
 
As early as 1924, the South African jurisprudence recognised that for there to be 
industrial peace, industrial conflicts must be permitted but regulated by law.196 Thus, 
South Africa ratified Conventions number 87 and 98 on the 18th February 1996.197 
Over and above this, South Africa is one of the three southern African countries 
where the right to strike enjoys constitutional protection.198  
 
The constitutional protection offered by South African law on the right to strike 
implies that unlike in Lesotho, it is possible to challenge the constitutionality of a 
legislative provision that proves inhibitive of the right.199 Section 23 of the 
Constitution of South Africa enshrines the right to strike in the South African Bill of 
Rights, it provides that: 
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 23.  (1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Every worker has the right- 
(a) to form and join a trade union; 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade 
union; and 
(c) to strike.   
 
Thus the South African Constitutional Court in the Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996200 (the first certification case) held that strike 
action is ‘the primary mechanism through which workers exercise collective power 
and the right to strike enables workers to bargain effectively with their employers’.201  
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court in NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and 
Others202 held that: 
  
This case concerns the right to strike. That right is both of historical and 
contemporaneous significance. In the first place, it is of importance for the dignity 
of workers who in our constitutional order may not be treated as coerced 
employees. Secondly, it is through industrial action that workers are able to 
assert bargaining power in industrial relations. The right to strike is an important 
component of a successful collective bargaining system. In interpreting the rights in 
section 23, therefore, the importance of those rights in promoting a fair working 
environment must be understood.203 [Emphasis added] 
 
In the above quote, the Constitutional Court expresses the importance of the South 
African workers’ right to strike and how it is embraced by the Bill of Rights. The 
Interim Constitution granted workers the right to strike for purposes of collective 
bargaining.204 This implies that the right to strike under the Interim Constitution was 
not an individual right, it was a right to be exercised by workers collectively.205 
However, the current Constitution, the final Constitution, grants the right to strike as 
an individual right and is not linked to any purpose.  
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The Labour Relations Act206 was enacted to give effect to the constitutional labour 
rights contained inter alia in section 23 of the Constitution.207 Section one of the Act 
provides inter alia that: 
 
1. The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social 
justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling 
the primary objects of this Act, which are- 
(a)  to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred 
by section 27 of the Constitution; 
(b)  to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a 
member state of the International Labour Organisation. 
 
In essence, over and above giving effect to the constitutional labour rights, the Act 
was enacted to ensure that South Africa complies with international labour 
standards. Thus the Act protects the right to strike for all employees in South 
Africa.208 The Act provides that the right to strike may only be exercised in respect of 
disputes of interest provided there has been an attempt to conciliate the dispute 
which attempt has failed, or a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the 
referral of the dispute to conciliation and 48 hours (or at least 7 days where the State 
is the employer) notice has been given prior to the commencement of the strike 
action.209  
 
However, the Act prohibits strikes where there is a collective agreement binding on 
parties to the employment relationship, which agreement prohibits strikes in respect 
of the dispute in issue.210 The same prohibition extends to the situation where the 
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collective agreement prescribes compulsory arbitration over the dispute in issue211 or 
the dispute in issue may be referred to the Labour Court in terms of the Act.212 
 
The Act, however, affords the strikes that comply with the provisions of the Act 
special protection. Strikes in conformity with the Act will not have delictual or 
contractual implications.213 Dismissal of lawful strikers is prohibited.214 However, 
dismissal may be justified if it is for misconduct committed during the strike or if the 
strike was unprocedural.215 
 
It can be argued that the Act extends the same protection afforded to procedural 
strikes to protest action.216 The Act provides that ‘every employee who is not 
engaged in essential or maintenance services has the right to partake in protest 
action’ organised by their trade union or federation of trade unions.217 However, the 
employees will only be protected if the protest is not purely political, for the protection 
in section 67 of the Act to extend to the participation in a protest, the purpose of such 
protest should be to pursue socio economic interests of the workers. Put differently, 
the purpose of the protest should be to attain from persons and institutions other 
than the employer, an advantage of a social economic nature for the workers.218  
 
The phrase ‘socio economic interest of workers’ is not defined. However, the Labour 
Court in Government of the Western Cape Province v COSATU219 held that it is not 
possible to give an all-embracing definition of the phrase. The Court observed that 
the phrase is capable of a range of interpretations, ranging from restrictive to more 
liberal ones.220 Relying on section one of the Labour Relations Act      Mlambo J then 
adopted a liberal approach and held that it is generally sufficient for a party to place 
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the demand or the matter giving rise to the protest ‘squarely within the ambit of the 
social status and economic position of workers in general’.221 
 
It is submitted that the liberal approach adopted by Mlambo J is the most preferred 
as it does not only uphold the purpose of the Labour Relations Act,222 but it also is in 
line with the international labour standards. The Freedom of Association Committee 
recognises that objectives of a strike action do not only concern better working 
conditions, but also the seeking of solutions to economic and social policy questions 
and problems facing the undertaking which are of direct concern to the workers.223  
   
4.2.1 Right to Strike for Public Officers in South Africa 
 
Historically, the South African labour law, like the present day labour jurisprudence of 
Lesotho, drew a distinction between the private and public sector.224 There was the 
Labour Relations Act of 1956225 for the private sector and the Public Service Act226 
for the public sector.227 However, the Labour Relations Act of 1995228 was enacted to 
give effect to the labour rights enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa and 
extends to all sectors. In essence, for all practical purposes, there is now a uniform 
labour legislation which does not differentiate between employees.229     
 
However, there are certain provisions of the Labour Relations Act that are applicable 
only to the public sector employees.230 None of these specific provisions of the Act 
deal with the right to strike. In essence therefore, the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act dealing with strikes apply to the public officers mutatis mutandis.231 
There are some provisions that specify that the operation of such provisions differs 
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where the state is the employer as compared to where the employer is a private 
proprietor.232  
 
Thus, in SAPS v POPCRU and Another233 the State and some trade unions in the 
public service were engaged in wage negotiations which reached a deadlock, as a 
result of which the general public service strike ensued. Some of the participants in 
that strike were members of the South African Police Service (SAPS), employed in 
terms of the SAPS Act,234 while others were employed in terms of the Public Service 
Act235. The SAPS lodged an application for a strike interdict, arguing that both 
officers engaged in terms of the SAPS Act and those employed in terms of the Public 
Service Act were prohibited from striking as they discharge essential services. The 
Constitutional Court held that not all employees of the SAPS are engaged in 
essential services, only ‘personnel’ employed in the SAPS who have been 
designated as members in terms of section 29 of the SAPS Act are covered by the 
essential services strike prohibition.236 
 
Therefore, it follows that public officers in South Africa do have the right to strike 
provided that the provisions of the Labour Relations Act have been followed. 
However, those public officers engaged in essential services do not enjoy the right to 
strike.237 Prior to the enactment of the Labour Relations Act, workers in the essential 
services were seen as having no real alternative dispute resolution mechanisms at 
their disposal.238 The introduction of the Labour Relations Act, however, remedied 
this situation.  
 
The Labour Relations Act establishes the Essential Services Committee which 
decides whether some services are really essential and is empowered to designate 
services as essential.239 Whenever there is a dispute of interest in the essential 
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services, the Labour Relations Act provides that such dispute should first be 
conciliated and if unresolved, to be arbitrated and the arbitration award will be 
binding on both parties unless parliament resolves otherwise.240  
 
4.2.2 Conclusion: South Africa 
 
From the discussion above, it is evident that South Africa, unlike Lesotho, maintains 
uniform labour laws with the same application to workers irrespective of whether one 
is employed in the private or public sector. This in essence gives the public officers 
the right to strike provided they comply with the requirements for a lawful strike as 
per the provisions of the Labour Relations Act. The Act does not only extend 
protection to the strike action conducted for purposes of collective bargaining, but 
also protest action for purposes of pursuing the socio economic interests of the 
workers.   
 
Workers who are involved in ‘essential services’, in South Africa, cannot embark on 
a strike action. However, unlike the public officers in Lesotho, they are not left 
without an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism. As discussed above, 
the Labour Relations Act provides a procedure for resolution of disputes of interest in 
the essential services. Unlike in Lesotho, the essential service employees in South 
Africa have a dispute resolution mechanism that results in a final and binding award. 
Furthermore, the Labour Relations establishes the Essential Services Committee 
which decides whether such services are indeed essential and which is empowered 
to designate services as essential. It follows therefore that since the Committee is a 
creature of statute, in discharging its duties. The committee performs administrative 
actions which are subjected to rules of natural justice. Therefore, services cannot, 
without a reasonable basis be designated as essential.   
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4.3 The Freedom to Strike: the Republic of Botswana 
 
Like Lesotho, Botswana (as Bechuanaland Protectorate) is a former protectorate of 
Great Britain.241 It is therefore not surprising that the current Constitution of 
Botswana 1966 is almost identical to the Constitution of Lesotho 1966. Chapter two 
of the Constitution of Botswana entitled ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of Individuals’ contains the Bill of Rights.  
 
Section 13, in chapter two of the Constitution, provides for freedom of assembly and 
association. Section 13(1) provides that: 
 
13. (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, 
his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and 
in particular to form or belong to trade unions or other 
associations for the protection of his interests.  [emphasis added]  
 
The question, therefore, is whether section 13(1) provides a constitutional basis for 
the freedom to strike in Botswana. The Canadian Supreme Court in Professional 
Institute of the Public Service of Canada v Northwest Territories242 held that the right 
to associate in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not entrench the 
right to bargain collectively or even strike. This decision, however, is inappropriate in 
so far as the interpretation of section 13 of the Constitution of Botswana is 
concerned. Unlike section 13(1) of the Constitution of Botswana, the Canadian 
Charter guarantees ‘freedom of association’ without expressly mentioning that 
individuals have the right to freely join and/or form trade unions for purposes of for 
protection of their interests.243 The purpose of being in association is not covered by 
the Canadian Charter, but, section 13(1) covers it i.e. for protection of interests of 
individuals.  
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Interests of individual employees includes, though not limited to, collective 
bargaining which has as its integral part, the right or freedom to strike.244 It follows 
therefore that section 13(1) of the Constitution of Botswana allows workers to 
embark on strike action. This purposive approach not only complies with 
international labour standards, it also accords with the liberal interpretation of the 
Constitution of Botswana in general, which the Courts of Botswana has on several 
occasions held should be adopted when interpreting constitutional provisions.245   
 
Before 2003, the Botswana law on strikes was, in most respects, similar to that of the 
United Kingdom.246 There was no express legislative reference to a right to strike, 
reference was made only to ‘unlawful industrial action’247. Strike was lawful unless 
declared otherwise. In theory, this approach provided the widest possible protection 
to strike action because, with exception of the essential service providers, there were 
no set procedures or preconditions to be satisfied before workers could embark on a 
strike.248 In practice, however, the government’s power to declare any industrial 
action as unlawful potentially amounted to the severest restriction on the right to 
strike in the whole of Southern Africa.249   
 
In 2003 the new Trade Dispute Act250 was enacted and it provided that every party to 
a dispute of interest has the right to strike or lock-out provided the procedure for a 
lawful strike set out by the Act has been followed.251 As a result, the right to strike is 
legally protected in Botswana, this is more so in light of the fact that the government 
of Botswana has ratified ILO Conventions No. 87, 98 and one other convention 
which is not ratified by both South Africa and Lesotho; the Labour Relations (Public 
Service) Convention No.151 of 1978.252  
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4.3.1 Right to Strike for Public Officers in Botswana 
 
As discussed above, the proper liberal interpretation of the Constitution of Botswana 
suggests that the Constitution does recognise the right/or freedom to strike. 
However, the importance of section 13(1) of the Constitution is, in respect of public 
officers, vitiated by section 13(2)(c) of the same. The said section provides that the 
right protected by section 13(1) may be limited inter alia for purposes of imposing 
restrictions on the public officers, local government officers and teachers. 
It is on the basis of section 13(2) that for a long time public officers in Botswana were 
denied a right to join or form a trade union and ultimately to strike. In terms of section 
2(1) of the then Trade Unions and Employers’ Association Act,253 it was illegal for the 
public officers to join and/or form trade unions.254 The Act defined an employee as 
any individual ‘who has entered into a contract of employment for the hire of his 
labour provided that such individual is not a public officer or somebody employed by 
a local authority unless he belongs to the industrial class or workers for the public 
corporation or parastatal’.255  
Therefore, public officers, not being employees in terms of the law, were excluded 
from the operation of section 13(1) of the Constitution (freedom of association).256 
However, under the current labour dispensation257 in Botswana, the position is 
different. The Trade Dispute Act defines an employee as ‘any person who has 
entered into a contract of employment for the hire of his labour’ excluding members 
of the disciplined forces258 and prison services.259 In essence, therefore, the 
definition of the term ‘employee’ in terms of the law of Botswana today encompasses 
public officers. In Attorney General obo Director of Public Service Management v 
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Botswana Landboards & Local Authorities Workers’ Union and Others260 the Court 
held that following Botswana’s ratification of the two key conventions (Conventions 
No. 87 and 98), the public officers in Botswana were, for the first time, accorded the 
right to strike.   
Thus, the operation of section 39261 of the Trade Dispute Act covers, inter alia, the 
public officers. It therefore follows that public officers have the right to withhold their 
labour. Thus, in 2011, public officers in Botswana embarked on unprecedented 
industrial action.262 The industrial action lasted for almost two months.263 On the 17th 
June 2011, (seven days after the last day of the strike) the Minister of Labour and 
Home Affairs passed Statutory Instrument,264 amending the Trade Dispute Act. 
The effect of the Statutory Instrument was to designate some services as essential. 
The newly designated services were; the veterinary services, teaching services, 
transport services, telecommunications services, diamond sorting, cutting and selling 
services and all support services in connection therewith.  The main reason for this 
amendment was to ensure that those employees engaged in these services, which 
are regarded as anchors to the economy, do not engage in a strike action.  
The National Assembly, however, on the 7th July 2011, resolved to annul Statutory 
Instrument No. 49 of 2011.265 The annulment of this statutory instrument meant that 
the newly designated services were no longer, in law, essential. However, a day 
after the annulment of the Statutory Instrument, the government expressed its 
disappointment in the annulment of the Statutory Instrument and announced that the 
Minister would shortly be re issuing the same.       
Thus on the 14th July 2011, the Minister through another Statutory Instrument266 re-
enacted the Statutory Instrument No. 49 of 2011. The ILO Committee of Experts on 
                                                          
260
 [2013] 6 BLLR 533 (BWCA), 544. 
261
 This section gives employees who are a party to a dispute of interest a right to strike, provided that the 
procedure for a lawful strike laid down by the Act has been followed. 
262
 Baakile. M and T.T. Tshukudu, ‘Deep Rooted Conflicts and Industrial Relations Interface in Botswana’ (2012) 




 April 2011 and was suspended on the 10  June 2011.  
264
 No. 49 of 2011. 
265
 Botswana Public Service Employers’ Union and Others v The Minister of Labour and Home Affairs and 
Another MAHLO-000674-11, para 22. 
266
 No. 57 of 2011. 
49 
 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations expressed its opinion on the 
Statutory Instrument No. 57 of 2011 as follows: 267 
The Committee was informed that the Government has adopted the Trade Disputes 
(Amendment of Schedule) Order 2011, on 15 July 2011, adding the veterinary 
services, teaching services and diamond sorting, cutting and selling services, and all 
support services in connection therewith to the existing essential services. The 
Committee once again recalls that essential services are only those the interruption 
of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the 
population (see General Survey of 1994 on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, paragraph 159). The Committee considers that the new categories 
added to the Schedule do not constitute essential services in the strict sense 
of the term and therefore requests the Government to amend the Schedule 
accordingly. [emphasis added]  
The Statutory Instrument was, however, not repealed. The application in Botswana 
Public Employees Union and Others v The Minister of Labour and Home Affairs268 
was then instituted in the High Court of Botswana (Lobatse Division). In that 
application, the applicants sought an order nullifying Statutory Instrument No. 57 of 
2011 (amending section 49 of the Trade Dispute Act 2003) on a total of eight 
grounds,269 the essence of which is that the amendment was ultra vires. The 
government argued that what constitute essential services depends on the 
circumstances of each country. 
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Dingake J held that the Constitution of Botswana and all other statutory provisions 
must be construed to uphold international law.270 The learned judge observed that 
Botswana, like Lesotho, is a dualist state, therefore, treaties that it has ratified are 
not automatically binding on it, however, such treaties should be used as aids to 
interpretation.271 The learned judge then concluded that as a member of the ILO, 
Botswana is bound by its Constitution.272 Therefore, Statutory Instrument No. 57 of 
2011 was held to be null and void to the extent that it introduces restrictions to 
workers’ rights, which are incompatible with Convention 87.273 The learned judge 
held that: 
On a plain reading of Section 49, it does not authorise a Minister to pass a statutory 
instrument that violates international law or Botswana’s international law obligations. 
In the premises, I hold that SI 57 being inconsistent with international law is hereby 
declared invalid and of no force and effect.274  
The government of Botswana has, however, appealed against this decision and the 
appeal is still pending before the Court of Appeal of Botswana.  
4.3.2 Conclusion: Botswana 
As it has been discussed above, the Constitution of Botswana, just like that of 
Lesotho recognises the freedom to strike. That same freedom is then viewed as a 
positive right275 that all workers excluding those in essential services are entitled to. 
It is worth noting that unlike in Lesotho, public officers in Botswana, have the right to 
strike. However, unlike in South Africa where there is a committee established by the 
statute to designate some services as essential, there is no such committee in 
Botswana. As a result thereof, the worker’s right to strike is easily undermined by 
designating some services as essential. This is easily done by a minister  publishing 
a gazette designating any services as essential.  
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This chapter discussed the law of strikes in two other jurisdictions, namely, South 
Africa and Botswana. In both these countries, unlike in Lesotho, public officers have 
a right to strike (though there are some limitations imposed by law). However, the 
main difference between the two jurisdictions with regard to the right to strike is that 
in South Africa, unlike in Botswana, the right to strike is enshrined in the Constitution. 
The discussion in the next chapter, therefore, will be on the lessons that Lesotho can 
draw from the position of the law of strikes in these countries. Recommendations for 


























Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the limitation on the public 
officers’ freedom of association in Lesotho is justified. As discussed in chapter three, 
Lesotho as a member of the ILO and a signatory to the Conventions No. 87 and 98 
is obliged to guarantee the freedom of association of all employees in compliance 
with the two conventions and the international labour standards as set by the ILO. 
Nonetheless, the limitation of the right to strike of public officers falls short of this. 
The previous chapters discussed the freedom of association, with particular attention 
to the right or freedom to strike, first, at an international level, dealing with the 
international labour standards on the issue of public officers’ right to strike, and then, 
at a local level dealing with the position of the law on the same issue in Lesotho. A 
comparative study followed, where South Africa and Botswana were used as the 
comparators.  The purpose of this chapter is to suggest some legislative reforms that 
may result in an effective and efficient guarantee of the freedom of association in 
Lesotho. In making recommendations in this chapter, lessons taken from these two 




Having concluded that the limitation of the public officers’ freedom of association is 
not justifiable to the extent that strikes are prohibited in the public sector, the 
following legislative reforms are recommended and discussed below: enactment of 
uniform labour laws (5.2.1), redefining the phrase ‘public officer’ for purposes of 
strike (5.2.1), establishment of an essential services committee (5.2.3), reform of 
dispute resolution processes in the public sector (5.2.4) and protection against 







5.2.1 Uniform Labour Laws 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, there is no single legislation regulating both 
public and private sector employees in Lesotho. For the private sector employees, 
the Labour Code as amended applies and for public sector employees, the Public 
Service Act with its amendments. It follows therefore that workers in the public sector 
do not enjoy the same legal protection as their counterparts in the private sector, 
with the law favouring employees in the private sector over those in the public sector. 
In essence, workers in Lesotho do not enjoy equal protection of the law. 
 
There is no ILO requirement that public and private sector employees should be 
afforded the same or different treatment. However, all workers should be treated 
equally with any differences in treatment between the two sectors being well 
justified.276 The public officers in Lesotho suffer prejudice as a result of the unequal 
treatment that they are subjected to. Specifically, the application of sections 19 and 
21 of the Public Service Act. Read together, these provisions prohibit strikes in the 
public sector. When a dispute of interest arises, parties are required to refer such 
dispute to the Conciliation Board for compulsory arbitration. However, the arbitration 
award issued by the board is not binding. 
 
The non-binding nature of the award defeats the purpose of compulsory arbitration 
as an alternative to strikes in the public sector. This is so because unlike their 
counterparts in the private sector, public officers do not have an effective mechanism 
for addressing and resolving disputes of interest. In the private sector, employees 
are allowed to embark on a strike over dispute of interest and those that are not 
allowed to embark on a strike go through compulsory arbitration, which unlike the 
Conciliation Board arbitration will result in an award binding on both the employer 
and employee. This unequal treatment amounts to an injustice to the public officers.  
 
This injustice can simply be remedied by enactment of uniform labour legislation to 
regulate employment relationships in both private and public sector. This piece of 
legislation should have the same effect for all workers irrespective of sector. 
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However, like the South African Labour Relations Act, the legislation may have 
certain provisions that are applicable only to the workers in public or private sector, 
as the case may be,277 provided that no category of workers will be unjustifiably 
deprived of any right that is enjoyed by the other category of workers. This piece of 
legislation should guarantee the right to strike to all employees with some justifiable 
exceptions. This will help avoid unnecessary preferential treatment being given only 
to a certain category of employees.  
 
5.2.2 Redefining ‘Public Officer’ for Purposes of Strike 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the Public Service Act of 2005 read with the 
Constitution defines the phrase ‘public officer’ as ‘any person holding or acting in any 
public office’ and the phrase ‘public office’ has been defined as ‘any office in the 
public service’ while ‘public service’ has been defined as ‘the service of the King in 
respect of the government of Lesotho’. In essence, therefore, anyone serving in ‘His 
Majesty’s’ service or the government of Lesotho is a public officer. This definition is 
too wide and as such, it leads to absurd consequences, especially in relation with the 
operation to the limitation of the freedom of association in terms of section 19 of the 
Public Service Act.278  
 
These absurd consequences may be avoided by redefining the phrase ‘public 
officer’, for purposes of exercising the right to strike. The term should be defined in 
such a way that it draws a distinction between, on the one hand, officers who by their 
official functions are directly engaged in the administration of the state, and on the 
other, those officials acting as supporting elements in these activities, namely, 
persons just employed by the government, by public undertakings and by 
autonomous public institutions. Only the former category may have their freedom of 
association justifiably limited to the effect that they may not embark on a strike.279 An 
alternative to this may be the use of the phrase ‘bargaining unit’ in section 19 of the 
Public Service Act instead of ‘public officers’. 
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Bargaining unit is defined in the Act as ‘all public officers on Grade H and below’.280 
It is worth noting that, despite the fact that the Act defines a phrase ‘bargaining unit’, 
the Act does not go on to use the phrase at all.  This category (the bargaining unit) 
may best be defined as the junior public officers. In other words, these are those 
public officers that by the nature of their official functions are not directly engaged in 
the administration of the state, for instance, office clerks, drivers, messengers and 
secretaries. Since this group does not exercise authority in the name of the state, 
there is really no justification for denying them the right to strike. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, denying this category of public officers the right to strike amounts 
to a violation of international labour standards.  
 
Therefore, it is submitted that section 19 should be repealed and replaced with a 
different provision to the effect that only public officers within a specified bargaining 
unit may embark on a strike. Having a provision of this nature will ensure compliance 
with the international labour standards.  
 
5.2.3 The Essential Services Committee 
 
In chapter four, it was indicated that the South African Labour Relations Act 
establishes the Essential Services Committee by virtue of section 70.281 It was also 
noted that such committee does not exist in Botswana;282 the same is true about 
Lesotho. However, it is worth noting that in terms of the laws of Botswana, the 
Labour Advisory Board should be consulted prior to designation of certain services 
as essential through secondary legislation.283 The Advisory Board of Botswana, 
unlike the South African Essential Services Committee does not have powers to 
designate some services as essential. The Chairman of the Board is also the 
Commissioner of Labour, who reports to the minister. As such, the impartiality of the 
Advisory Board may be questioned. On the other hand, members of the Essential 
Services Committee in South Africa are appointed on merit and the portfolio of the 
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chairperson of the Committee is not an ex officio portfolio, the chairperson being 
appointed from the members.284 It follows, therefore, that the Essential Services 
Committee is more likely to be objective and impartial in discharging its duties.  
 
In the light of the above discussion, it is submitted that there is a need for the 
establishment of an Essential Services Committee in Lesotho. Just like the South 
African Committee, the Committee in Lesotho should be composed of experts in 
labour law with integrity. None of the Committee members should be appointed or 
serve in any office in the public service during his term of service as a member of the 
Committee. The Committee should have powers to designate some services as 
essential. Therefore, if the Committee will designate some of the services offered by 
some public officers’ as essential, such officers right to strike will be justifiably 
restricted as they will then qualify as essential service providers, as discussed 
above. However, there should be an effective mechanism through which officers 
designated as essential services providers may effectively address their disputes of 
interests.  
 
5.2.4 Reform of Dispute Resolution Processes in the Public Service  
 
As noted from the previous chapters, there is no efficient dispute resolution 
mechanisms put in place in the public service to resolve disputes of interest. This is 
problematic, and more so in light of the fact that public officers cannot embark on a 
strike. As discussed in chapter three, the Public Service Act285 establishes a 
Conciliation Board to handle disputes of interest. However, awards of the Board are 
not binding on the parties. This calls for immediate attention of the legislature as it 
amounts to violation of the workers’ rights. To avoid this violation, there should be a 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration procedure put in place for those public 
officers whose right to strike has been restricted for any reason. The outcome of 
conciliation may be an advisory award, but then parties should reserve the right to 
refer the matter for arbitration despite the outcome of conciliation. The outcome of 
arbitration should be an award binding on all parties.  
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5.2.5 Protection Against Protest Action 
 
The discussion in chapter four established that South African labour law extends 
protection to workers participating in protest action.286 In South Africa every worker 
not engaged in essential services is entitled to participate in protest action organised 
by their trade union or a federation of trade unions.287 However, the protection is not 
afforded to the protest actions which are political in nature, the employees 
participating in the protest action will only be protected by labour law if the protest 
action is intended to promote and protect the socio economic interests of the 
workers. This approach is in line with international standards. The ILO recognises 
that objectives of strike action in the context of labour law do not only concern better 
working conditions, but also, the seeking of solutions to social and economic 
problems which are of direct concern to the workers.288   
 
The need to extend legal protection to protest action should be balanced with the 
need to maintain a stable economy. It is common cause that a stable economy is a 
fundamental requirement for positive investment climate which is one of the factors 
considered by investors before investing in a given economy. It is also common 
cause that protest actions have the potential of negatively affecting individual 
businesses and eventually the entire economy. Therefore, in light of the fact that 
Lesotho is a small economy with a desire for economic growth and development, it is 
submitted that while employees should be allowed to embark on strikes over 
disputes of interest, protest action should not be protected so as to avoid restricting 
economic growth and development.   
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As this dissertation has revealed, public officers in Lesotho do not enjoy the freedom 
to strike. Without a guarantee of the freedom to strike, public officers are left 
vulnerable and open to abuse by the employer as arbitration awards issued by the 
Conciliation Board are not binding.289 The public officers are left without effective 
dispute resolution mechanisms, especially with regard to disputes of interest. This 
shortcoming may best be corrected by legislative recognition of the public officers’ 
freedom to strike. 
 
A strike is the most valuable weapon available for employees in enforcing their 
rights. Thus strikes constitute an integral part of the activities of employees’ 
associations as it is through such actions that workers promote and protect their 
economic and sometimes social interests. However, public officers in Lesotho have 
no channel for addressing their disputes of interest. They cannot strike and they do 
not have the benefit of having a binding award. This is in direct violation of 
international labour standards,290 which provide that where workers (as in the case of 
Lesotho, public officers) are denied the right or freedom to strike, there should be an 
alternative remedy guaranteed to them to ensure protection of their interests at the 
workplace.291 In essence therefore, the limitation on the public officers’ freedom of 
association in Lesotho is not justifiable. This is more so because the prohibition of 
strikes in the public sector puts such workers at the mercy of their employer and 
leaves them without an avenue to enforce and protect their interests. It is high time 
that the government of Lesotho considers a redress to the prolonged injustice that 
the public officers have been subjected to. As Kahn-Freund admirably noted:  
 
No country I know of suppresses freedom to strike in peace time, except 
dictatorships and countries practicing racial discrimination...a legal system which 
suppresses the freedom to strike puts the workers at the mercy of the employers.292    
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Figure 5.5. Percentage Distribution ofthe Population 15 Years and Above 
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Figure 6.6 Employed Population 15 Years and Above with Secondary 
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